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Nico Krisch’s new book, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of  Post-
National Law (BC), is a major contribution to the field of  legal pluralism as applied 
to international legal regimes.1 In clear and accessible prose, BC develops a nuanced 
account of  the structural features of  global law from a wide range of  carefully consid-
ered normative positions and empirical claims, and provides detailed case studies of  
pluralism in action. For readers of  I·CON, I would regard it as essential reading.
Given space limitations, my focus will be on the main disagreements I have with BC. 
Krisch stakes out complex positions, often through an “on the one hand [x], but on 
the other [y]” style of  analysis that anticipates objections. My criticisms do not always 
capture the subtleties of  the arguments and, for the sake of  debate, are sometimes 
more sharply drawn than warranted. I will make three points. First, Krisch’s conclu-
sions are heavily dependent upon a theoretical construction—a supposed dichotomy 
between “constitutional” and “pluralist”—that is, in fact, a false one. Second, “consti-
tutional pluralism” is a structural feature of  the national legal orders to which BC pays 
the most attention (European), belying the dichotomy. Third, the case studies in BC 
provide empirical support for an alternative view: at least in some domains, a rights-
based constitutional order is being constructed on pluralist foundations.
1. A false dichotomy
Driving much of  the analysis of  BC is a supposed distinction between two types—the 
constitutional and the pluralist—which Krisch characterizes as “competing models” 
(p. 226) and “true alternative[s]” (p. 71). BC sustains discussion of  only one mode of  
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constitutionalism, embodied in what he labels the “foundational” and “comprehensive” 
constitution. In its liberal-democratic guise, the constitution constitutes state and polity, 
and provides the normative underpinnings for constructing and challenging the polity’s 
legitimacy over time. The foundational constitution is assumed to be complete: it estab-
lishes a single “overarching legal framework” (p. 23) and “comprehensively determin[es] 
the structure, processes, and values” of  the system (p. 53). In contrast to pluralism, con-
stitutionalism entails “clear cut hierarchies” (p. 103), stable Grundnormen, settled “rules 
of  recognition” (pp. 11, 72, 74), and “ultimate conflict norms” and “rules” (pp. 293, 
296) whose purpose is to enable a designated authority to resolve conflicts among norms 
and institutions effectively. Pluralism is explicitly conceptualized in opposition to consti-
tutionalism. Whereas constitutionalism is related to “depoliticization,” and the desire 
“to tame politics” through legal rules (p. 69), pluralism is about “politics” and “political 
deliberation” but not the “rule of  law” or “rule-based processes,” (pp. 23, 69, 277).
What is crucial is how Krisch applies these distinctions to the relationship between 
treaty-based systems and national legal orders, the central topic of  the book. Krisch 
sums up his position as follows:
Constitutionalism and pluralism are distinguished . . . by the different extent to which [each] 
formally link[s] the various spheres of  law and politics. While pluralism regards them as 
separate in their foundations, global constitutionalism, properly understood, is a monist conception 
that integrates those spheres into one. As a result, rules about the relationship of  national, 
regional, and global norms are immediately applicable in all spheres, and neither political nor 
judicial actors can justify non-compliance on legal grounds (p. 242; emphasis added).2
Thus, global constitutionalism can only find its expression in a strong form of  hege-
monic monism.3 The resulting model is indistinguishable from federalism. “A consti-
tutionalist setting needs to define hierarchies between the polities,” Krisch claims, in 
order “to integrate them into a common whole,” a task that must include the promul-
gation of  clear rules delineating the respective competences of  all levels of  governance, 
as well as fixing the “rules for the amendment of  the overall constitution” (p. 275).
I reject Krisch’s constitutionalism–pluralism dichotomy on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. To get to the notion of  “constitutional pluralism” one must 
specify what is simultaneously constitutional and pluralistic about the structure 
of  a legal system.4 When considering the interface between international regimes 
2 “In a nutshell, postnational constitutionalism attempts to provide continuity with the domestic constitu-
tionalist tradition by constructing an overarching legal framework that determines the relationships of  
the different levels of  law and the distribution of  powers among institutions” (p. 23).
3 De Búrca distinguishes between two forms of  constitutionalist theory in this field: the “strong” position, 
of  which Kirsch is a representative, and a “soft” approach, which would include the constitutional plural-
ist position. See Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of  Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi, 
51 Harv. Int’l l.J. 32 (2010). See also literature cited infra, notes 4 and 5.
4 See Neil Walker, The Idea of  Constitutional Plur alism, 65 Mod. l. rEv. 317 (2002); Mattias Kumm, The 
Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State, 
in rulIng tHE World: ConstItutIonalIsM, IntErnatIonal laW, and global govErnanCE 258 (Jeffrey L., Dunhoff  and 
Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); Daniel Halberstam, Local, Global, and Plural Constitutionalism: Europe Meets 
the World, in tHE Worlds of EuropEan ConstItutIonalIsM 150; Miguel Maduro, Courts and Pluralism: Essay on 
a Theory of  Judicial Adjudication in the Context of  Legal and Constitutional Pluralism, in rulIng tHE World 356; 
Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes, 16 Ind. J. global lEgal stud. 
633 (2009).
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and national legal orders, scholars typically identify, as the basic scaffolding of  a 
constitution, jus cogens norms, other substantive fundamental rights, standards 
of  procedural due process, and access to justice.5 These norms find expression in 
multi-lateral and regional treaties, are firmly supported by opinio juris, and overlap 
fundamental rights inscribed in the vast majority of  national constitutions.6 What 
makes the system “constitutional” is an overarching normative structure:7 the 
code of  rights that judges and other officials are under a legal duty to enforce; and 
a set of  shared techniques that national and international judges have developed to 
adjudicate rights, in dialogues with one another. At the same time, the distribution of  
authority within this presupposed constitution is pluralistic: the system is comprised 
of  discrete hierarchies, national and treaty-based, each of  which has an autonomous 
claim to legitimacy. Sovereignty—the authority to enforce fundamental rights—is 
“decentralized,”8 not least, in that no “ultimate conflict rule” or “final authority” to 
resolve conflicts exists.
Before turning to empirics, let me clarify the nature of  the disagreement. First, to 
my knowledge, no one in the field would contest the basic elements of  Krisch’s concept 
of  pluralism: by definition, under conditions of  pluralism, there is no “single decision-
maker” applying “overarching conflict rules,” who will have the final word on many 
important legal questions (p. 296). Understanding legal pluralism, we would presum-
ably agree, requires the analyst to take into account multiple vantage points at once, 
including the respective internal legal perspectives of  actors operating in autonomous 
legal orders. Second, Krisch argues from a position that makes “constitutional plural-
ism” an oxymoron, a theoretical impossibility, whereas others in this same field have 
staked out a rights-based version of  constitutionalism that accommodates pluralism.9 
For Krisch, normative authority flows exclusively from hierarchy, rather than being 
grounded (my view) in the intrinsic legitimacy, binding nature, and integrating prop-
erties of  fundamental rights themselves. Third, I reject Krisch’s law–politics distinc-
tion. Rights politics under conditions of  pluralism are today heavily structured by law, 
legal discourse, and other rule-like norms and procedures, and they have steadily built 
new legal practices that serve to manage pluralism. As the empirics in BC show, rights 
politics and constitutional pluralism have been co-constitutive of  one another. We 
have not moved “beyond constitutionalism,” rather, the age of  global constitutional-
ism has barely begun.
5 Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitian Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 
1(1) J. global ConstItutIonalIsM 53, 62 (2012), MICHEl rosEnfEld, tHE IdEntIty of tHE ConstItutIonal subJECt: 
sElfHood, CItIzEnsHIp, and CoMMunIty 243–80 (2010); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Trade Governance 
Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism, in ConstItutIonalIsM, MultIlEvEl tradE govErnanCE and soCIal rEgulatIon 
5 (Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006).
6 I collected data on national constitutions adopted since 1787. Of  114 national constitutions that 
have entered into force since 1985, we have reliable information on 106. Of  these, all 106 contained 
a charter of  rights, and all but five established a judicial mode of  rights protection (North Korea, 
Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Laos, and Iraq [in its 1990 constitution, now abrogated]). The last constitu-
tion to leave out a charter of  rights was the racist 1983 constitution of  South Africa. Alec Stone 
Sweet, Constitutions, Rights, and Judicial Power, in CoMparatIvE polItICs 162 (Daniele Caramani ed., 
2011).
7 Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19 Eur. J. Int’l l. 749 (2008).
8 For a discussion of  “decentralized sovereignty” with respect to rights protection, see Supra, note 5.
9 Krisch barely engages the literature (see supra, notes 4 and 5) on constitutional pluralism (BC, pp. 73–76).






494 I•CON 11 (2013), 491–500
2. The constitutional pluralism of  European rights protection
The false dichotomy is fully exposed when we examine the formal “architecture” of  
rights-based constitutionalism in Europe (ch. 4).10 For Krisch, “constitutionalism” 
implies a focal point of  “ultimate authority” (p. 103), whereas “pluralism” accepts 
“conflicting claims to ultimate authority” (p. 70). When it comes to rights protec-
tion, however, many domestic constitutional orders in Europe are pluralistic. Either 
we have to accept that these national systems are no longer, or never were, truly 
constitutional, or the theoretical framework of  BC must be rejected.
As has been extensively documented,11 not only have conflicting authority claims 
between national high courts not been resolved, they have generated the kind of  inter-
jurisdictional, and jurisgenerative, politics that Krisch associates with pluralist orders. 
To illustrate, Krisch (pp.  14–17) argues that three basic strategies are available to a 
jurisdiction (X) when it is threatened by the lawmaking and supremacy claims of  an 
external jurisdiction (Y), when Y seeks a change in how X takes decisions and makes 
law. First, X can pursue “containment,” by working to “limit the impact” of  Y, in order to 
maximize its own autonomy and minimize disruption to standard ways of  doing things. 
Second, X can seek to “transfer” the underlying logics of  its ways to Y, thus lowering the 
costs of  adjustment. Third, X can “break” with its established repertoire and, in effect, 
embrace or leverage pluralism as a means of  increasing its own relevance, flexibility, 
and capacity to constrain Y in the future. Krisch developed the framework to analyze 
pluralist politics but, in fact, it neatly applies to rights politics within national orders 
that possess multiple, functionally differentiated high courts (the majority in Europe).
Consider bids on the part of  constitutional courts to “constitutionalize” adjudica-
tion in the ordinary (non-constitutional) courts, through promoting the direct effect 
of  rights. It is important to stress that this process, which is ongoing, is analogous to 
the Court of  Justice of  the European Union’s (CJEU) move to “constitutionalize” the EU 
through its doctrines of  supremacy and direct effect. In Western Europe, constitution-
alization has gone furthest in Germany and Spain, in the form of  delicate accommo-
dations forged by inter-court conflict and dialogue. Nonetheless, the supreme courts 
continue to marshal significant “containment” operations,12 and their “transfer” 
efforts often succeed. In Italy, the Italian Court’s bid for supremacy failed: a “war of  
judges” ended in a settlement that, in effect, codified pluralism. Under the so-called 
“doctrine of  the living law,” the Supreme Court (Cassazione) has de facto the “last 
word” on statutory interpretation and application, accepting only the “persuasive 
authority” of  the ICC’s jurisprudence.13 In France, the Constitutional Council has no 
10 BC is both Euro-centric and court-centric, which some might see as a limitation; see Shaffer, supra, note 
1. I have chosen to assess the book on Krisch’s chosen terms.
11 Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts versus Supreme Courts, 5 Int’l J. Const. l. 44 (2007); WoJCIECH sadurskI, 
rIgHts bEforE Courts: a study of ConstItutIonal Courts In post-CoMMunIst statEs of CEntral and EastErn EuropE 
20–25 (2005); alEC stonE sWEEt, govErnIng WItH JudgEs: ConstItutIonal polItICs In EuropE 121–122 (2000).
12 For Spain, see Leslie Turano, Spain: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: The Struggle for Jurisdiction between the 
Tribunal Constitucional and the Tribunal Supremo, 4 Int’l J. Const. l. 151 (2006). For Germany, see Gerhard 
Robbers, Fur ein neues Verhaltnis zwischen BVerfG und Fachgerichtsbarkeit, nEuE JurIstIsCHE WoCHEnsCHrIft 
938 (1998).
13 Garlicki, supra note 11, 55–56; Stone Sweet, supra note 11, 121–122.
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formal means of  imposing its rights interpretations on the Supreme Court (Cassation) 
or Supreme Administrative Court.14 Each of  the three high courts is autonomous in 
its domain, and both supreme courts have positioned themselves to enforce EU rights 
and the European Convention of  Human Rights (ECHR), even against statute. The 
outcome comprises a hugely important “break” with traditional separation of  powers 
doctrine (the prohibition of  judicial review of  statute), while constituting a pluralist 
order within the French legal system.
In Central and Eastern Europe, too, many national supreme courts have refused 
to accept the binding interpretive authority and supremacy claims of  the constitu-
tional courts.15 The Polish courts have negotiated their own version of  the Italian 
“living law” solution; and in the Czech Republic, the Supreme Court provoked a 
“war of  judges” when it “openly revolted” against the Constitutional Court. In his 
empirical study of  this topic, Garlicki (a former judge of  the Polish Constitutional 
Court and the ECHR Court) concludes: “constitutional courts appear as weaker 
participants . . . and, in case of  conflict, they are not always able to deliver that last 
word.” Indeed, for constitutional judges, a strategy of  “dialogue and persuasion” 
has been more effective than have efforts to prevail in an “open conflict” about 
ultimate authority.16
The development of  European rights has further consolidated rights pluralism 
within national orders. Today, one finds multiple sources of  rights that are judicially 
enforceable against all conflicting infra-constitutional legal norms, including statute; 
there are multiple high courts that enforce these rights; and often there is no agreed 
upon conflict rule or procedure to settle conflicts of  norms and authority. In most 
national legal systems, three such sources of  rights—the national constitution, the 
EU treaties, and the ECHR—overlap. Individuals have a choice of  which source to 
plead, and judges have a choice of  which right to enforce. Ordinary judges may seek 
to limit the impact of  the jurisprudence of  the European courts; but they may also 
prefer to apply it, rather than domestic constitutional case law, in order to enhance 
their own authority and subvert that of  constitutional courts. The German labor 
courts, for example, have partnered with the (CJEU) to raise German standards of  
rights protection in employment law, regaining the authority they had lost to German 
Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which has been steadily marginalized. Indeed, 
the German labor courts have invested heavily in the development of  EU rights, as a 
means of  cajoling the GFCC to change its (less-progressive) positions.17
Authority conflicts between high courts within domestic systems have long been a 
primary source of  pluralist interactions between the CJEU and national constitutional 
courts (a fact Krisch largely ignores in chapter 4). To take a recent, dramatic example, 
14 In 2008, the French Constitution was revised to permit the Supreme Court and the Council of  State to 
refer laws to the Constitutional Council for review, in the context of  ongoing litigation. The Constitutional 
Council, however, can neither force the other high courts to send a reference, nor control how the latter 
interpret and apply European law.
15 Garlicki, supra note 11; Sadurski, supra note 11, 20–25.
16 Garlicki, supra note 11, 68. In the footnote to this passage, Garlicki rightly notes that the  analysis applies 
as well to the CJEU and the ECtHR in its relations to national constitutional courts.
17 Alec Stone Sweet & Kathleen Stranz, Rights Adjudication and Constitutional Pluralism in Germany and 
Europe, 19 J. Eur. pub. pol’y 92 (2011).
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in 2010, the Czech Constitutional Court declared a part of  the CJEU’s ruling in Land-
tová to be ultra vires under Czech constitutional law, a first in the EU. The ruling was an 
attempt to discipline the Supreme Administrative Court, which had sent the Landtová 
reference to the CJEU in the first place. In response, the Supreme Administrative Court 
denied that it was bound by the Constitutional Court’s decision, and referred the mat-
ter to the CJEU, clearly indicating that it disagreed with the Constitutional Court on 
both the merits and the authority claim (the case is still pending before the CJEU). This 
is domestic constitutional pluralism in action, as structured by the legal enmeshment 
of  European and national systems of  rights protection. Krisch analyzes such author-
ity conflicts as if  they were primarily between a European court and a national consti-
tutional court, thus missing an essential part of  the story.
With respect to the ECHR, all 47 full members of  the Council of  Europe have now 
incorporated the Convention (through constitutional provision, legislative act, or 
judicial decision) in a form that provides for the judicial review of  state acts, includ-
ing statute, under the ECHR.18 In all but two states (Ireland and the UK), judges must 
refuse to enforce statutes judged to be incompatible with the ECHR.
The domestication of  the ECHR has diffused judicial review powers with respect 
to rights claims to all national judges, and institutionalized constitutional pluralism 
at the domestic level. In Belgium, the Constitutional Court has determined that 
the ECHR possesses supra-legislative but infra-constitutional rank, which led 
the Supreme Court to hold that the ECHR possesses supra-constitutional status, 
thereby enhancing its autonomy vis-à-vis the Constitutional Court. Both courts 
are “supreme” in their respective domains, but neither can impose its will on 
the other. Would Krisch label such a situation “constitutional” or “pluralist”? In 
2007, the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) abandoned a strong dualist posture, 
holding that Italian judges are required to interpret national law in light of  the 
ECHR and, where a conflict is unavoidable, to refer the matter to the ICC.19 Some 
ordinary judges simply ignore this obligation, while asserting their own authority 
to refuse to apply a controlling statute on grounds of  incompatibility with the 
Convention.20 In the absence of  a reference, which is left to the discretion of  the 
presiding judge, the ICC has virtually no means of  enforcing its own case law. In 
France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, the de facto bill of  rights is the ECHR, 
not the national constitution, and in Scandinavia and much of  post-communist 
Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, new bills of  rights were modeled directly 
on the Convention. One could multiply examples, but the point should be clear: 
national rights protection in Europe today is both constitutional and pluralistic. The 
qualities that Krisch attributes to the foundational, comprehensive constitution—
18 Stone Sweet, supra note 8, Appendix, at 84–85.
19 The evolution of  the ICC’s position is traced in Mercedes Candela Soriano, The Reception Process in Spain 
and Italy, in a EuropE of rIgHts: tHE IMpaCt of tHE ECHr on natIonal lEgal systEMs 405 (Helen Keller and Alec 
Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
20 Mads Andenæs & Eirik Bjørge, National Implementation of  ECHR Rights, in ConstItutIng EuropE: tHE EuropEan 
Court of HuMan rIgHts In a natIonal, EuropEan and global ContExt (Andreas Follesdal, Birgit Peters, & Geir 
Ulfstein eds., forthcoming May 2013). Sabino Cassese, a judge on the Italian Constitutional Court, asserts 
regularly that Italy now has three judicially enforceable, rights-based “constitutions.”
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clear hierarchies, conflict rules, final authority—are either non-existent or too 
weak to carry the burden of  his argument.
In chapter 4, Krisch defeats a pallid strawman, a creature whose existence depends 
entirely on the constitutionalism–pluralism dichotomy. If  the regime were a consti-
tutional one, he claims, we would expect to find a “unified, well-ordered European 
human rights law with the ECHR at its top” (p. 126); instead one finds pluralism. In 
line with his basic framework, Krisch interprets any resistance by national constitu-
tional courts to supposed “supremacy” claims of  the CJEU or the Strasbourg Court 
as data counting against the “constitutional narrative” (pp. 109–112). In fact, such 
data counts in favor of  the constitutional pluralist view. No constitutionalist plural-
ist (including Daniel Halberstam, Mattias Kumm, Miguel Maduro, Michel Rosenfeld, 
Neil Walker, myself) would expect a constitutional court to commit suicide, by for-
mally subjugating the national constitutional order to the Convention. They would, 
instead, expect constitutional judges to assert their own supremacy within their own 
domain, and then to engage in the politics of  pluralism, including initiating dia-
logues, both cooperative and conflictual, with the European courts and their own 
national supreme courts. This is, in fact, what has happened.
While Krisch emphasizes containment strategies, he all but ignores the dynam-
ics of  “transfer” and “break,” even when incorporation has been facilitated by 
the same ruling analyzed. Thus, he reads the GFCC’s Görgülü decision (2005) 
only in terms of  containment. BC is silent on the fact that, in this same decision, 
the German Court made a clear “break” with long-standing dualist orthodoxies. 
Görgülü establishes a strong presumption that all German judges are to apply the 
Court’s jurisprudence when it is on point, except in “exceptional” circumstances, 
including when “it is the only way to avoid a violation of  the fundamental prin-
ciples contained in the Constitution.”21 The GFCC’s ruling also expanded the con-
stitutional complaint procedure. Individuals can now challenge—as a violation 
of  German basic rights—judicial rulings that ignore or fail to properly take into 
account the European Court’s case law, an influential approach pioneered by the 
Spanish Constitutional Tribunal. Rulings post-Görgülü have further enhanced the 
status of  the Convention at bar.22
The facts support a general proposition about European rights politics that appears to 
be irreconcilable with BC. Given formal incorporation, any increase in the effectiveness 
(the authority) of  the Strasbourg Court’s case law within national orders will reinforce 
(a) the constitutional aspects of  the overall regime, and (b) the pluralism of  domestic 
systems of  rights protection. This is, in fact, what is happening in most states.
3. Constitutionalism and global law
BC presents three detailed case studies of  post-national pluralism that, in my view, 
provide strong empirical support for the view of  constitutional pluralists. The latter 
argue that a pluralist constitution can be built through interactions between other-
21 Frank Hoffmeister, Germany: Status of  European Convention on Human Rights in Domestic Law, 4 Int’l 
J. Const. l. 728 (2006).
22 Stone Sweet, supra note 8, 70–71.
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wise autonomous legal orders. The claim boils down to the following: the more inten-
sive are the rights-based interactions between different legal orders, the more likely 
it will be that a constitutional jurisprudence of  pluralism will gradually emerge and 
give a discursive, legal structure to these interactions. Whereas Krisch emphasizes the 
pluralism of  European rights protection in chapter 4, it is also clear that his discussion 
is also about “things constitutional,” in a profound sense. Further, just as Krisch does 
(pp. 170–172, 289–291), constitutional pluralists stress certain mech anisms of  sys-
temic construction, such as Solange type judicial rulings and other forms of  dialogic 
engagement. What about the case studies presented in chapters 5 and 6?
Chapter 5 of  BC focuses on the targeted sanctions regime that the UN Security Council 
developed after the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. Krisch rightly 
highlights the “administrative character” of  sanctions: specific individuals are publicly 
named and targeted for mandatory punitive measures (including travel bans and asset 
freezes) that states, having only a “subordinate, non-discretionary” role, are required 
to implement (pp. 156–157). Whereas the Security Council had all but ignored human 
rights issues, other UN organs, especially the various human rights committees, as well 
as a host of  national courts attacked the regime for failing to provide affected individu-
als with due process, including the means of  challenging their appearance on the lists 
and access to an independent judicial authority. The chapter concludes with an analysis 
of  the CJEU’s famous Kadi (2008) ruling, which subjected EU implementing regulations 
to review under EU fundamental rights, and found the regime deficient. In response, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1904/2009 creating an Ombudsperson to process 
and to make formal recommendations on individual petitions for delisting.
The empirics of  this case provide strong support for the constitutional pluralist 
position, which stresses the overarching, overlapping structure of  rights, and 
mechanisms for converting rights-based conflict into rights-based, constitutional 
dialogues.23 Under this view, the “administrative character” of  the UN sanctions 
regime took on “constitutional” features when targeted individuals began to 
challenge it on rights grounds before UN organs and courts. National courts and the 
CJEU invoked fundamental rights found in both national, regional, and international 
law, and a Solange style dynamic began to appear. In Krisch’s account, judges are the 
central managers of  the emergent pluralist system, which he describes in terms of  
the “enmeshment,” “layering,” and “entanglement” of  international and national 
levels of  governance (pp.  160, 163). Yet, as BC emphasizes, the extent of  pluralist 
“enmeshment” proved to be conditional on the resolution of  rights and other 
constitutional issues. Indeed, the Ombudsperson himself  would later state that “the 
decision of  the CJEU, coming at the culmination of  ongoing criticism—academic, 
political, and otherwise—as to the lack of  a fair and transparent process, led directly 
to the . . . establishment of  the Office of  the Ombudsperson.”24
23 It is important to note that, in Kadi I, the CJEU did not embrace even the relatively weak constitutional-
pluralist position proposed by Advocate General Maduro. Instead, it stressed the autonomy of  the EU’s 
legal system, arguably, to reinforce its own authority with respect to national high courts; see Halberstam, 
supra note 4. See also De Búrca, supra note 3, 40–48.
24 Lecture of  the Ombudsperson, National Autonomous University of  Mexico, June 24, 2011, available 
at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/pdfs/Mexico%20Presentation%20-%2024%20June%20
2011%20%28English%29.pdf.
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Since BC was published, pressures for reform of  the regime continued to mount, 
as Krisch had predicted (pp.  159–160). In Kadi II (2010), the General Court of  
the EU (GCEU) actually employed a Solange formulation: it would engage in “full 
review” of  the implementation, within the EU, of  the sanctions regime, “at the 
very least” and “so long as” the de-listing “procedure operated by the Sanctions 
Committee clearly fails to offer guarantees of  effective judicial protection.” The 
GCEU annulled the regulation at issue while rejecting, as insufficient, the reforms 
provoked by Kadi I. The regime established by SC 1904/2009, the General Court 
declared, neither provided for “effect ive judicial procedure for review of  decisions 
of  the Sanctions Committee,” nor for a “mechanism to ensure that sufficient infor-
mation be made available to the person concerned in order to allow him to defend 
himself  effectively.” The GCEU also criticized the fact that de-listing an individual 
would “require consensus within the Committee,” that is, any member could veto 
an Ombuds person’s recommendation to remove an individual from the list.25
In light of  Kadi II, and under growing pressure from UN committees and other 
organs, the Security Council again responded. Resolution 1989/2011 renewed the 
office of  the Ombudsperson, codified extensive procedures, information exchange, and 
“dialogue” with listed individuals, and bolstered the influence of  the Ombudsperson’s 
recommendation to delist. A delisting recommendation will now prevail unless there 
is consensus not to adopt it, in which case states further procedures are required if  
the listing is to be maintained.26 Less than two weeks after the adoption of  Resolution 
1989/2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter Terrorism, 
Martin Scheinin, weighed in. While acknowledging that the Security Council “has 
proven responsive to criticisms” and had strengthened due process, Scheinin none-
theless concluded that the new 1989/2011 system still does not “meet international 
human rights standards concerning due process or fair trial,” leading him to endorse 
a Solange strategy on the part of  courts “as long as proper due process is not guar-
anteed at the United Nations level when listing individuals or entities as terrorists, 
national (or European Union) courts will need to exercise judicial review over the 
national (or European) measures implementing the sanctions.” He ended by propos-
ing more extensive reforms which, if  adopted by the Security Council, would make it 
“likely that national or European courts [would] require petitioners to exhaust the 
delisting procedure of  the Ombudsperson before exercising their jurisdiction in rela-
tion to the national or European implementing measures.”27
To date, the Ombudsman has opened 33 cases, resulting in 19 decisions to delist 
the petitioner, one denial, and one withdrawn request (the rest are pending).28 
On October 5, 2012, the Security Council delisted Mr. Kadi, the plaintiff  who had 
activated the European courts as well as several national courts.29 This is slow 
25 Case T-85/09, Kadi v. EU Commission (Sept. 30, 2010), ¶¶ 126–128.
26 SC Resolution 1989 (2011) June 17, 2011, ¶ 21 and Annex II.
27 In another forum, Scheinen has argued that “the Kadi case is compatible with international human 
rights law, as expressed in United Nations human rights treaties,” and that “the outcome . . . has much 
support in institutional United Nations law,” Martin Scheinen, Is the CJEU Ruling in Kadi Incompatible with 
International Law?, 28 y.b. Eur. l. 637 (2009).
28 One can follow the Ombudsperson’s progress at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/status.shtml.
29 SC 10785, Oct. 5, 2012, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10785.doc.htm.






500 I•CON 11 (2013), 491–500
going, but the process now has a rights-based, interactive structure. The process 
is also meaningfully about “things constitutional.” The famous Solange saga, 
after all, showed how inter-jurisdictional conflict (between the GFCC and the 
CJEU) over contending supremacy claims could serve to construct rights-based 
constitutionalism in Europe, despite the fact that supremacy conflicts were never 
firmly resolved.
Krisch treats Solange style engagement as a paradigmatic mechanism for gener-
ating the “reciprocity expectations” and “interface norms” (pp. 186–194) that are 
necessary for the successful management of  rights-based pluralism within Europe. 
Yet when human rights are not central to pluralism, the intensity of  constitutional 
dialogue is greatly reduced. Chapter 6 examines how sharp differences in American 
and European approaches to risk regulation and genetically modified foods generated 
WTO litigation; in response, Krisch shows, European courts are now actively engag-
ing with WTO law in this area, despite the fact that the CJEU had held that the WTO 
agreements do not possess direct effect within the EU order. Although such interac-
tions may eventually take on constitutional features,30 for now they seem geared to 
supplying functional coordination on narrower grounds. More generally, as Gregory 
Schaeffer stresses in his review of  BC, most global regulation and standard setting in 
areas such as manufacturing, banking, taxation, bankruptcy, money laundering, air 
transport, and so on, is today generated through processes that connect the decision-
making of  transnational actors, organizations, and state officials.31 While much of  
transnational governance is pluralist in complexion, most of  it is not constitutional 
in any meaningful sense.
4. Conclusion
BC is the most important book yet written on the development of  legal pluralism at the 
intersection of  certain (but not all) international regimes and national legal orders. Given 
the present forum, my focus has been on the constitutional aspects of  the book. I have 
made three main points. First, the constitutionalism/pluralism dichotomy is a false one. 
Scholars now routinely conceptualize legal systems as both constitutional and pluralis-
tic for purposes of  empirical analysis. Second, when it comes to rights protection, most 
domestic constitutional orders in Europe are in fact pluralistic. As Krisch argues, legal 
pluralism and authority conflicts often go hand in hand, and we find both within national 
constitutional orders. Third, the notion of  “constitutional pluralism” fits the data pre-
sented in BC better than does the framework fashioned from the constitutional/pluralism 
dichotomy. The book provides strong support for pluralist, rights-based constitutionalism 
when rights are, in fact, on the table, and when rights-protecting courts, especially Euro-
pean, are major actors. And, as one would expect, we find less evidence of  constitutional 
pluralism when rights are not in play, and when rights-protecting courts are not the main 
actors.
30 See Petersmann, supra note 5.
31 Shaffer, supra note 1, 577–579. 
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